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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is vested in this court pursuant to a Notice
of Pour-Over entered by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
September 4, 1987.

(R. 652). Jurisdiction was vested in the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah pursuant to a Notice of Appeal
timely filed (R. 617, 618, and 624). The transfer of the case
from the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals is made
pursuant to Rule 4A(a) of the Amendments to the Rules of the Utah
Court of Appeals.
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
This appeal is brought pursuant to certain provisions of
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 103 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence.

Because of the length of these citations,

they are set forth in Appendix A to this Brief.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from an order denying
defendant/appellants1 Motion for A New Trial following the entry
of judgment upon a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff at a trial
held in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District in and
for Utah County, State of Utah, before the Honorable Ernest F.
Baldwin, Jr., Judge Pro Tern.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arises out of an incident which occurred on or
about January 22, 1984 in Utah County, State of Utah at an
apartment complex known as Centennial Apartments.

At said time

and place, plaintiff claims that she slipped and fell as a
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consequence of certain negligent acts of defendants and its
employees or agents causing personal injuries for which she sought
a judgment for damages from defendants.

(R. 1, 2, 3 and 4).

At

the time the plaintiff was a tenant of the apartment and
defendants were owners of the same,

(R. 1, and 7). Defendants

have denied that they were liable for any injuries which plaintiff
may have received.

(R. 7, 8 and 9).

A trial on the issues proceeded in the District Court of
the Fourth Judicial District before the Honorable Ernest F.
Baldwin, Jr., Judge Pro Tern, sitting with a jury.

The trial

commenced on the 20th day of April, 1987 and concluded on the 24th
day of April, 1987 at which time the jury entered a verdict in the
amount of $150,000.00 in favor of plaintiff and against
defendants.

Judgment was entered upon the verdict and defendants

filed a Motion for a new trial which was denied by the court.
Whereupon defendants filed timely notice of appeal to the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah which subsequently poured-over the case
to the Utah Court of Appeals.
The following relevant facts are material to the issues
raised by this appeal:
1.

During the course of the trial, plaintiff who was

pregnant (R. 1452) at the time, suffered abdominal distress which
was significant enough that she chose to absent herself from part
of the trial.
2.

(R. 1396) .

Prior to leaving, she was observed to be in distress

and to go into the restroom with certain women jurors as reported
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by the bailiff to the court.
3.

(R. 1454).

The abdominal distress was significant enough that

plaintiff was examined on a bench just outside the courtroom
during the recess by a physician who was present to testify on
behalf of plaintiff.
4.

(R. 1453, 1454).

The bailiff reported the incident to the court and

subsequently defendants made a Motion for a mistrial, upon which
the court never ruled.
5.

(R. 1452 to 1454).

There was no evidence which would justify a

consideration of punitive damages and the matter was not submitted
to the jury on the issue of punitive damages.
6.

(R. 365, 366).

Plaintiff testified in response to questions from her

counsel that she wanted justice and that she did not want the
things that happened to her to happen to anyone else.
7.

Counsel for the defendants objected to this question,

but the court refused to rule on the objection.
8.

(R. 914).

During his closing argument, counsel for plaintiff

asked the jury to award exemplary damages.
9.

(R. 914).

(R. 1726 to 1728).

Counsel for defendants requested that the court

instruct the jury that it could not award punitive damages and
took exception to the court's refusal to so instruct the jury.
(R. 1054).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
When the court received information from the bailiff that
the plaintiff was in abdominal distress and was seen going into
the restroom with certain women jurors, the court had an
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affirmative duty to inquire on the record of the circumstances in
the restroom.

The court should have determined whether any

improper conversation or familiarity occurred at that time.
The court should have stricken the testimony of the
plaintiff requesting exemplary damages and admonished the jury to
disregard the same.

Further, the court should have stricken the

closing argument of plaintiff's counsel wherein he requested
exemplary damages and admonished the jury to disregard the same.
The court should have given the cautionary instruction on
damages requested by defendants.

Each of these errors were

prejudicial in that they affected the substantial right of the
defendants to a fair trial and the court abused its discretion in
not granting a new trial.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Did the trial court abuse its discretion and commit
prejudicial error in the following particulars:
1.

In failing to strike plaintiff's testimony requesting

exemplary damages and in failing to admonish the jury to disregard
the same?
2.

In failing to strike plaintiff's rebuttal argument

requesting exemplary damages and in failing to admonish the jury
to disregard the same?
3.

In failing to give defendants' requested cautionary

instruction on damages?
4.

In failing to determine if misconduct had occurred

between the plaintiff and jury by making the proper inquiry of the
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plaintiff and certain members of the jury?
5.

In failing to find that the verdict of the jury was

excessive in that it appears to have been given under the
influence of passion or prejudice or as a consequence of
irregularities in the trial?
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE STRICKEN
PLAINTIFF'S EXEMPLARY DAMAGE TESTIMONY AND
CLOSING ARGUMENT AND SHOULD HAVE ADMONISHED
THE JURY TO DISREGARD THE SAME AND
INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT IT COULD NOT AWARD
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.
A,

The Trial Court Should Have Stricken Plaintiff's
Testimony Asking for Exemplary Damages and Should
Have Admonished the Jury to Disregard the Same.

Although plaintiff asked for punitive damages in her
Second Amended Complaint (R. 206), plaintiff did not request
punitive damages in her requested jury instructions. An
examination of those instructions on damages requested by the
plaintiff indicates no reference whatsoever to punitive damages.
(R. 365, 366).
At the conclusion of the direct examination of the
plaintiff, her counsel asked her what she wanted from this case
and she responded that she wanted justice and that she did not
want the things that happened to her to happen to anyone else.
(R. 914). When Mr. Ivie objected on behalf of defendants,
plaintiff's attorney commenced the next question before the court
ruled.

The court interrupted Mr. Harding and stated, "Well,
-5-

there's nothing before the court to rule on."

(R. 914). While

the court may have been technically correct since plaintiff's
answer was already in and since Mr. Ivie did not move to strike
the same, nevertheless, the court had a duty in the interest of
justice to strike the answer and admonish the jury to disregard it
on the court's own volition.
The attention of this court is directed to Appendix B
which sets forth the numerous times the trial judge interjected
himself into the proceedings during the direct examination by Mr.
Harding of various witnesses during the plaintiff's case in chief.
Appendix B indicates that of 14 3 pages out of approximately 466
pages of direct examination by Mr. Harding during plaintiff's case
in chief, the court on its own pointed out improper questions by
counsel, struck testimony from the record and interrupted the
examination by counsel to conduct its own examination of various
witnesses.

It should be noted that in each of these instances,

the court acted completely on its own volition and without any
solicitation (by way of objection or otherwise) on the part of
defense counsel.

This illustrates that the court not only

recognized its duty to control the presentation of evidence, but
actually inserted itself into the process to a significant degree,
at least during the plaintiff's case in chief.
Apparently the court was acting pursuant to the inherent
power of the court to supervise the presentation of evidence in
the interest of justice and to further the purposes of Rule 103(d)
of the Utah Rules of Evidence which is set forth in Appendix A.
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This is sometimes known as the plain error rule and it recognizes
the need for the court to take notice of plain errors which affect
substantial rights even if they are not brought to the attention
of the court.

In the instant case, the trial judge repeatedly

acted affirmatively to keep error out of the record before counsel
had an opportunity or an inclination to enter an objection as
illustrated by Appendix B.
However, when the court was asked to rule on plaintiff's
objectionable testimony regarding exemplary damages, the court
refused to rule which was a clear abuse of the court's discretion
in that it invited the jury to make an example out of the
defendants even though the plaintiff was not entitled to punitive
damages.
B.

The Court Should Have Stricken Plaintiff's Closing
Argument Requesting Exemplary Damages and Should
Have Admonished the Jury to Disregard the Same.

During the rebuttal portion of his closing argument, Mr.
Harding pleaded with the jury not only to compensate the plaintiff
for her injuries, but also that they should send a message to
other landlords.

Plaintiff's counsel stated, "And you can show

the defendants and all other landlords that just don't care, that
this is an important case, an important matter."
added).

(Emphasis

Mr. Harding then went on to argue that unless they fully

compensated the plaintiff, they would not be sending a message to
the defendants.

However, if they did fully compensate the

plaintiff, the message would go out to landlords that they could
not let snow and ice accumulate during the winter so as to create
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a hazardous condition-

Mr. Harding closed his rebuttal argument

by referring to the candles of justice in Utah County and then
asked the jury to return a verdict for his client, "For the full
amount of compensation, for the full amount of justice, in this
case to do justice."

Clearly, this is an argument asking for

exemplary damages in addition to compensatory damages.

(R. 1726

to 1728) .
It is true that Mr. Ivie did not object on the record to
the offensive closing argument.

There is authority for the

proposition that counsel may wait until the closing argument is
completed before objecting to the offensive portions thereof.

In

Stein: Closing Argument, §86 (1985), it states:
Generally speaking, objections should be
interposed at the time the harm is apparent.
In such regard it has been recognized that
the better practice is to object to argument
at the time it is made. Counsel, however,
should guard against being premature and
should not object in the middle of an
offensive sentence. There is authority to
the effect that counsel may wait until the
end of the argument and state his objections
then. . . .
The court should not be hesitant to admonish offending
counsel during the course of closing argument.

In fact, the court

is in a better position to do it than opposing counsel.

The

attorney may be reluctant to advocate an objection during the
course of closing argument for fear of disapproval by the trial
judge and alienation of the jury.

On the other hand, the court

should have no such concerns and should guard against a
miscarriage of justice by monitoring the closing argument so that
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the jury can be admonished to disregard inappropriate comments
immediately following the time they are made.

This would have

been consistent with the court's practice of monitoring Mr.
Harding as demonstrated by Appendix B.
It is also acknowledged that Mr. Ivie did not make a
formal objection on the record to the closing argument after it
was completed.

Rather, he directed the court's attention to the

offensive argument (R. 1054) and the court abused its discretion
by failing to strike the offending language from the closing
argument on the record, in front of the jury and admonishing the
jury to disregard the same before it started to deliberate.
It should be noted that the jury had not yet started to
deliberate at the time the court's attention was directed to the
improper closing argument.

Following the conclusion of the

closing argument, the court directed the bailif to escort the jury
to the jury room but directed them not to start to deliberate
until all of the exhibits were taken to the jury room and the door
thereto was closed.

(R. 1730).

Thereupon, a long discussion

between the court and counsel pertaining to other matters took
place.

It was during the course of this discussion that Mr. Ivie

directed the court's attention to the offensive closing argument.
(R. 1744).

Following the same the court then stepped from the

bench and assisted the clerk in taking exhibits to the jury room
and although the record does not show exactly when the jury
started to deliberate, it is reasonable to assume that it was not
prior to this time.

(R. 1744).
-9-

C.

The Court Should Have Instructed the Jury That It
Could Not Award Exemplary Damages.

Defendants requested that the court give the cautionary
instruction informing the jury that they were not to award any
damages by way of punishment or to make an example out of the
defendants.

(R. 458). The court refused to give that instruction

during deliberations in chambers prior to closing arguments.
Following closing arguments, but before the jury started to
deliberate, the defendant took exception to the court's failure to
give said instruction.

(R. 1744).

The requested instruction is taken from Jury Instruction
Forms For Utah (JIFU) 90.77 which reads as follows:
Not To Award Punitive Damages
In this case you may not include in any
award to plaintiff any sum for the purpose
of punishing the defendant, or to make an
example of him for the public good or to
prevent other accidents. Such damages would
be punitive rather than compensatory, and
the law does not authorize punitive damages
in this action.
The testimony of the plaintiff asking for examplary
damages and the inappropriate closing argument by her counsel
required the court to give this requested instruction and its
failure to do so was an abuse of discretion.

We have been unable

to find any case law precedent that is identical to this case, but
there are cases which, although distinguishable, support
defendant's position with analogous reasoning.

The Supreme Court

of Washington considered the issue of the failure to give such an
instruction in the case of Conrad v. Lakewood General Hospital,
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410 P.2d 785 (Wash. 1966).

Mrs. Conrad brought an action against

the defendants for medical malpractice following gallbladder
surgery and was awarded judgment of $12,500. There was no claim
for punitive damages asserted in the action and the court refused
to give a cautionary instruction similar to the one requested
in the instant case.

The court held that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in refusing to give the instruction since the
plaintiff did not ask for punitive damages or put on evidence in
support of the same.

Ic[. at 789.

The logical inference is that

had plaintiff asked for exemplary damages, the court would have
been required to give the cautionary instruction advising the jury
that it was not to award exemplary damages.

This same reasoning

should have been applied by the trial court in the instant case
and it was prejudicial error not to give the cautionary
instruction requested by the defendants.
The Oregon Supreme Court considered a similar issue in
the case of Garrett v. Olsen, 691 P.2d 123 (Or.App. 1984).

The

plaintiff was a school teacher who brought an action for battery
against a student and his father.
damages which were awarded.

The plaintiff sought punitive

Defendants appealed and assigned as

one of the errors the court's failure to give a requested
cautionary instruction on punitive damages which would have
required the court to consider the conduct of the teacher as
mitigation against punitive damages.

The court held that the

failure to give the instruction was an abuse of discretion and the
matter was remanded for a retrial on the punitive damage issue.
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The analogous reasoning to the instant case is that if
the cautionary instruction was appropriate in Garrett where the
matter of punitive damages was submitted to the jury, it is even
more appropriate in this case where plaintiff asked for punitive
damages inappropriately as set forth above.

By not giving the

requested instruction, there is no way of knowing if the jury
properly understood that it could not award exemplary damages nor
is there any way of knowing if the jury was influenced by
prejudice and passion.
The Garrett case is also instructive on another point.
In that case plaintiff conceded that the instruction was correct
but stated that the defendant failed to preserve the error for
appeal.

The court rejected that argument and stated that if the

requested instruction was correct, and if it was requested on an
issue on which the trial court failed to instruct, the claim of
error was preserved.

In the instant case, it may be argued that

defendants failed to properly preserve their right to object to
the testimony of the plaintiff on punitive damages and also to the
closing argument of plaintiff*s counsel.

This matter was

discussed above and it is defendants1 position that not only
should the court have ruled on its own volition, but the fact that
defendants properly requested a cautionary instruction on punitive
damages has preserved the matter for appeal.

The court had ample

opportunity to correct the error by giving the requested
instruction and its failure to do so constituted prejudicial
error.
-12-

Floyd v. Dodson, 692 P.2d 77 (Okl.App. 1984), considered
the effect of the court's failure to instruct on punitive damages
in a case involving intentional infliction of emotional distress*
Plaintiff had prayed for actual damages of approximately $5,000
and punitive damages of $50,000. The trial court instructed the
jury that it could not award more than $55,000 but refused to
instruct the jury on the matter of punitive damages, apparently
believing that punitive damages could not be awarded for this
cause of action.

(There is an interesting footnote to the

decision in which the appellate court ponders the inconsistency of
the trial judge in telling the jury that it could award $55,000
and in refusing to instruct on punitive damages.)

The appellate

court held that the court's refusal to instruct the jury on
punitive damages required that the matter be remanded for a new
trial on the punitive damage issue.

The court stated as follows:

Herein, the plaintiff's proof clearly did
not support an award of actual damages in
the amount of $10,000. Plaintiff had, in
fact, prayed for only $5,505 in actual
damages and $50,000 in punitive damages.
The jury, as is evidenced by the size of the
award, however, clearly did seek to punish
the defendant and award damages in excess of
the claimed compensatory damages, even in
the absence of an appropriate instruction.
The trial court's refusal to instruct the
jury on punitive damages was accordingly not
only error but further necessitates our
reversal of the case because it is now
impossible to distinguish that portion of
the jury's award which represents the amount
of damages actually sustained by the
plaintiff from that portion of the award
which was meant to punish the defendant.
Id. at 81.
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The rationale of the Oklahoma appellate court can be
applied to the instant case.

Whenever you have a party seeking

punitive damages, the court has a duty to properly instruct the
jury.

If the issue of punitive damages is submitted to the jury,

it must be properly instructed relative to the same.

If not, the

court should also instruct the jury by giving a cautionary
instruction against awarding punitive damages.

This is

particularly true when plaintiff seeks punitive damages as in this
case.

The failure to properly instruct the jury on the matter of

punitive damages leaves the jury to conjecture on what is
appropriate and what is not.
It is acknowledged that as a general rule the court has
wide latitude in determining what instructions are given to the
jury.

Normally the refusal to give an instruction is not grounds

for remand.

However, when a jury is insufficiently advised or

when it appears that a jury is misled, it is prejudicial error for
a court not to give a requested instruction.

In State v.

Ouzounian, 26 Utah 2d 442, 491 P.2d 1093 (1971), the Utah Supreme
Court stated:
A refusal to give an instruction cannot be
the basis for reversal, unless the jury was
insufficiently advised of the issue they
were to determine or if it appears they were
confused or mislead to the prejudice of the
person complaining. (Emphasis added).
Id. 491 P.2d at 1095.
In Ouzounian, the court held that the jury was
sufficiently advised and was not mislead by the testimony.
However, in the instant case, the jury was mislead by the
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testimony of the plaintiff and the closing argument of her
attorney in which the plaintiff asked to make an example of the
defendants.

The instructions given by the court on damages were

insufficient to advise the jury that exemplary damages were not
part of compensatory damages.

That is the very reason for a

separate instruction in JIFU whereby the jury is cautioned not to
give exemplary damages.

Even in those cases where punitive

damages are permitted, the jury should be cautioned about the
limitations thereon.

See Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc.,

675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983), and the line of cases cited therein.
POINT II.
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE INQUIRED ON THE RECORD
REGARDING IMPROPER CONTACT BETWEEN THE
PLAINTIFF AND THE JURY.
During the course of the trial plaintiff, who was
pregnant (R. 1452) at the time, suffered abdominal distress which
was significant enough that she chose to absent herself from part
of the trial.

(R. 1396).

Prior to leaving, she was observed to

be in distress and to go into the restroom with certain women
jurors.

(R. 1454).

The abdominal distress was significant enough

that the plaintiff was examined on a bench just outside the
courtroom during a recess by a physician who was present to
testify on behalf of plaintiff.

(R. 1453, 1454).

The bailiff reported the incident to the court and
subsequently defendant made a motion for a mistrial.

(R. 1452).

The court never actually ruled on the motion for a mistrial but
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did comment that the bailif noticed that she was in the ladies
restroom and that there was women jurors with her in the room,
(R. 1454).

The court then makes the statement on the record,

"Yes, I do have that report that she was in there, there was said
nothing out of order, no misconduct, but the women jurors were in
the room with her."

(R. 1454).

There is nothing on the record that would justify the
court finding that there was no misconduct since the court never
inquired of the plaintiff, the jurors involved or of the bailiff
concerning the matter.

This is an abuse of the court's

discretion.
The procedure of the court should have followed to
determine if jury misconduct occurred is set forth in several Utah
cases.

The court should have thoroughly examined the incident to

determine what the nature of the contact was to determine whether
the jury was tainted thereby.

State v. Anderson, 65 Utah 415, 237

P. 941, (1925); State v. Durand, 569 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1977); State
v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985); and State v. Larocco, 64 Utah
Adv.Rep. 49 (Utah 1987).
In Anderson, a juror rode to and from the trial with a
prosecuting witness during the course of a two-week trial.
Affidavits of both stated they had not discussed the trial and
that the juror had not been influenced in any way.

The case was

remanded for a new trial with the holding that:
Any conduct or relationship between a juror
and a party to an action during trial that
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would or might consciously or unconsciously,
tend to influence the judgment of the juror
authorizes and requires the granting of a
new trial, unless it is made to appear
affirmatively that the judgment of the juror
was in no way affected by such relationship
or that the parties by their conduct waived
their right to make objection to such
conduct.
Anderson, 237 P. at 942.
In Purand, three jurors had coffee in a sheriff1s office
on two separate occasions when deputies who were witnesses in the
case were present.

The jurors and the officers testified that

there was no conversation about anything pertaining to the case.
The Utah Supreme Court strongly disapproved of the conduct and
stated that even the appearance of misconduct should be avoided.
However, even under those circumstances it was necessary to show
that prejudice had occurred and the court found after a thorough
examination of the incident that no prejudice against the
defendant resulted and therefore the criminal conviction was
upheld.

Durand, 569 P.2d at 1109.
In Pike, the Utah Supreme Court found that a mistrial

should have been granted explaining that, "Anything more than the
most incidental contact during the trial between witnesses and
jurors cast a doubt upon the impartiality of the jury and at best
gives the appearance of the absence of impartiality."
P. 2d at 279-80.

Pike, 712

The court went on to state that Utah has adopted

a very strict rule that, "Prejudice may well exist even though it
is not provable and even though a person who has been tainted may
not, himself, be able to recognize the fact." Id. at 280. The
court found that any improper contact "which goes beyond a mere
-17-

incidental, unintended, and brief contact" raises the presumption
of prejudice,

id.

In that case the improper contact was a

conversation between a witness who was the arresting officer and a
juror which the court held created "a sense of familiarity" which
could affect the credibility of that witness with the juror.

Id.

The fact that the juror denied prejudice or influence was
insufficient to overcome the presumption since there was no
question about the familiarity that was produced as a result of
the conversation.
In Larocco, the conversation was with a juror and a
witness who was not the main witness in the case.

It was also

significant that the testimony of that witness was uncontroverted
and so his credibility was not at issue and any familiarity was
not prejudicial.

It is significant that the procedure followed by

the trial judge enabled the court to make such a finding.

The

court held that after the trial judge listened to the testimony
and arguments regarding possible prejudice that the court could
reasonably determine that the state had sustained its burden of
demonstrating that no prejudice resulted from the contact.
The fact that all of these cases involved criminal
convictions, should not alter the basic fact that a fair trial
requires an impartial jury.

There is not one standard for

impartiality for criminal cases and a separate standard for civil
cases.
It should be noted that in each of these cases the burden
was upon the prosecution to show on the record that no prejudice
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resulted from the contact with the juror.

This is because in each

case it was a prosecution witness who had contact with jurors. In
this case it was the plaintiff who was in the restroom with
members of the jury.
The court should have initiated the inquiry on the
subject upon learning of the incident in the restroom from the
bailiff.

This would have allowed the court to determine on the

record what transpired in the restroom.

It should have been

relatively simple for the court to inquire on the record of the
plaintiff and the jurors what was said by the parties and what
exactly transpired.

Since the court did not do this, there is no

way for the court to make any finding that there was no misconduct
involved.
It cannot be said that the defendants have waived their
right to raise this issue on appeal since at the time defendants
made a motion for a mistrial and the court was made aware of
defendants1 claim.

This placed upon the court the responsibility

to make the necessary inquiry and its failure to do so constituted
prejudicial error.
POINT III.
THE VERDICT WAS EXCESSIVE AND APPEARS TO
HAVE BEEN GIVEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF
PASSION OR PREJUDICE.
It is conceded that the traditional general rule
regarding the amount of jury verdicts recognizes that the
determination of unliquidated damages involves a question of fact
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which is solely for the jury, or the trial court which passes
upon the jury verdict, so that an appellate court has very little
authority to review the adequacy of the damage award.

The modern

trend of cases illustrate a very important exception to the
general rule.

This is set forth in Section 1(e) of 12 A.L.R.4th

96 at p. 107 as follows:
This original position has, for all
practical purposes, been abandoned by most
appellate courts which now rather freely
review and adjust damage awards. This does
not mean, however, that great weight will
not be given to the determination of the
jury and trial court and while a review of
damage awards may not be had merely because
an award might appear either liberal or
merger, a court may interfere with a verdict
where it appears from the evidence that the
amount bears no reasonable relationship to
the loss to be compensated for, or where it
is obvious that the amount of damages
awarded by the jury was highly conjectural
or imaginative.
See footnote 31 which cites the case of Dagnello v. Long Island R.
Co., 289 F.2d 797 (2nd Cir. 1961), in which the court stated in
a very exhaustive opinion that the courts of appellate
jurisdiction in 47 states have power to pass upon the issue of
damages and the Courts of Appeal of the First, Third, Fourth,
Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and the District of Columbia
Circuits, have recognized their power to reverse a judgment even
though the basis for review is the inadequacy or excessiveness of
the verdict.
This rationale was followed in two New Mexico cases. The
first is somewhat analogous to the present case.

In Gonzales v.

General Motors Corp., 553 P.2d 1281 (N.M. 1976), Gonzales brought
-20-

a products liability action against GMC claiming that he suffered
personal injuries as a consequence of a defective automobile.

The

injuries consisted of extensive burns with resulting scarring.

He

was hospitalized on two occasions for a total of 54 days.

He

appeared to have made a fairly good recovery with residual
problems related to the scarring both from a functional and
cosmetic standpoint.

He also testified that he suffered from

depression and that testimony was supported by his wife's
observations.

The medical expenses and lost wages were

approximately $8,200.

The jury verdict was approximately $275,000

with $260,000 being for general damages.
Defendants made a motion for a new trial claiming that
the verdict was excessive and was the result of prejudice or
passion.

In support of that argument, defendants claimed, for the

first time, that plaintiff's counsel made an improper closing
argument in that it contained inflammatory statements.

The

offensive argument was a reference to the fact that in plaintiff's
mind he was handicapped for life and that he had suffered brain
damage.

No objection was made to this argument at the time nor

was the jury admonished to disregard the same by the trial court.
Notwithstanding the failure of the record, the New Mexico
Supreme Court held that the damages were excessive and reduced
them by the amount of $200,000 and directed the parties to either
settle for approximately $75,000 or the case would be remanded for
a new trial.
The case is analogous to the present case in that the
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appellate court recognized its responsible to reduce excessive
verdicts based upon prejudice or sympathy.

In the instant case,

plaintiff's unwarranted seeking of exemplary damages and the
possible irregularity of the jury in its contact with plaintiff in
the restroom adequately demonstrates that the verdict is suspect
and may well be the product of sympathy, prejudice and passion.
In the second New Mexico case of Regenold v. Rutherford,
679 P.2d 833 (N.M.App. 1984), Regenold was injured in an
automobile accident with the defendant and brought an action for
compensatory as well as punitive damages.

Defendant had been

drinking and he admitted liability for the accident in an attempt
to keep his culpable conduct from the jury.

The trial court

allowed testimony of this type to be submitted to the jury on the
issue of punitive damages.

At the conclusion of the evidence the

trial court ruled that there was not sufficient evidence to submit
the punitive damage question to the jury and so advised the jury
that the punitive damage claim had been dismissed.
However, defendant made no request for a cautionary
instruction on damages whereby the jury would have been instructed
that it could not award punitive damages.

The jury awarded

compensatory damages of $47,500 based upon plaintiff's injuries
which consisted of a compression fracture of the L3 vertebrae; the
broken portion of the vertebrae did not heal by the time of trial
and was not expected to heal in the future.

There was also a

narrowing of the disc space with some evidence of herniation of
the disc.

There was testimony that the condition would degenerate
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in the future.

Plaintiff continued to suffer from low back pain

which was expected to continue in the future.

The court rejected

defendant's claim that the award was excessive.
Had the trial judge in the instant case followed this
procedure, the jury would have been advised that it could not
award exemplary damages.

In Regenold, the jury was advised that

the punitive damage claim had been dismissed so that the court had
a basis for finding that the jury did not consider punitive
damages in assessing its award.

However, in the instant case, the

jury was left without any instruction or admonishment on the
subject by the trial judge's refusal to so inform the jury.

This

failure affected a substantial right of the defendants and it was
therefore prejudicial error for the court to refuse to give the
requested instruction.
The case is cited herein because it illustrates the
handling of the punitive damage question.

The court rejected the

notion of defense counsel that the jury was influenced by
prejudice or passion, because the jury was properly advised that
the punitive damage claim had been dismissed.

The appeals court

then inferred that had counsel asked for a cautionary instruction
on the punitive damage issue, it would have been given by the
court.

Id. at 836.

Nevertheless, the appeals court held that the

verdict was not excessive under the circumstances and that there
was no showing of prejudice or passion on the part of the jury.
It is also important for the proposition that the appeals court
was the proper forum for reviewing the adequacy of the jury
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verdict.
Defendants acknowledge that each case must be reviewed on
its own merits and that there is no formula by which the court can
determine the adequacy of a verdict.

However, there must be some

reasonable relationship between general damages and special
damages.

See 6 Am.Jur. Trials 963, Predicting the Verdict §24 and

Griffin v. General Motors Corp., 403 N.E.2d 402 (1980 Mass)
(holding that the disproportion between special damages and
general damages is a proper factor for the court to take into
account in deciding whether excessive damages have been awarded).
The problem with the present case is that the jury verdict has
been tainted by plaintiff's improper testimony and the improper
argument of her counsel on the issue of exemplary damages.

Thus,

it is impossible to know what influence this prejudice had on the
verdict.
It is acknowledged that Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence states that an error must be predicated upon a ruling
which affects a substantial right of a party.

Defendants maintain

that the errors set forth above were singularly prejudicial and
the cumulative effect thereof denied defendants the right to a
fair trial.

The last thing that the jury heard from either of the

parties was plaintiff's inflammatory closing argument in which her
counsel referred to the "candles of justice" in Utah County and
called upon the jury to recognize the importance of this case by
making an example of the defendants.

This was an obvious attempt

to inflame the jury and the resulting verdict of $150,000 which
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was nearly 12 times the amount of specials claimed in plaintiff's
closing argument.

(R. 1688, 1689).

It is not the intent of defendants to herein reargue the
nature of the injuries suffered by plaintiff or to suggest a
particular formula that the jury should have followed in assessing
damages.

It is defendants' position that the irregularity set

forth above casts a cloud of doubt upon the fairness of the trial
and the resulting jury verdict.

Thus, defendants are entitled to

have the matter remanded for a new trial free of the taint of the
irregularities and misconduct set forth above.
CONCLUSION
The trial court abused its discretion when it failed to
grant defendants' motion for a new trial.

Defendants were

entitled to a new trial because the trial court committed
prejudicial error which affected the substantial rights of the
defendants and denied them a fair trial in the following
particulars:
1.

By failing to strike plaintiff's testimony requesting

exemplary damages and in failing to admonish the jury to disregard
the same.
2.

By failing to strike plaintiff's offensive rebuttal

argument requesting exemplary damages and in failing to admonish
the jury to disregard the same.
3.

By failing to give defendants' requested cautionary

instruction on damages whereby the jury would have been told not
to award any damages for the purpose of making an example of the
-25-

defendants•
4.

In failing to determine if improper contact was had

between the plaintiff and members of the jury during the course of
the trial.
5.

By failing to rule that the verdict of the jury was

excessive in that it was given under the influence of passion or
prejudice or as a consequence of improper conduct on the part of
plaintiff and her attorney.
Defendants respectfully request that the court set aside
the ver&T&t #nd judgment entered thereon and remand the case to
the district court for a new trial on all of the issues.
Dated this

/J

day of December, 1987.
IVIE

Henry E. vHeaMi
Attorneys for Defendants
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APPENDIX A
RULE 103
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be
predicted upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a
substantial right of party is affected, and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting
evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike
appears of record, stating the specific ground of
objection, if the specific ground was not apparent
from the context; or
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one
excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence
was made known to the court by offer or was apparent
from the context within which questions were asked.
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add
any other or further statement which shows the
character of the evidence, the form in which it was
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon.
It may direct the making of an offer in question and
answer form.
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall
be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent
inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any
means, such as making statements or offers of proof or asking
questions in the hearing of the jury.
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking
notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although they
were not brought to the attention of the court.

RULE 59
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
NEW TRIALS
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a
new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all
or part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided,
however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and
direct the entry of a new judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the procedings of the court,
jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or
abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or
more of the jurors have been induced to assent to
any general or special verdict, or to a
determination by chance or as a result of bribery,
such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of
any one of the jurors.

(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to
have been given under the influence of passion or
prejudice.

APPENDIX B
This is a sample of the number of times the trial court
interrupted plaintiff's counsel without solicitation of defense
counsel (either by way of objection or motion to strike) for the
purpose of ruling upon the admissibility of evidence and
admonishing plaintiff's counsel regarding the form of certain
questions. This is illustrated by showing the page number on
which the court made the unsolicited rulings against plaintiff's
counsel and includes only the plaintiff's case in chief. It does
not involve any cross-examination of defense witnesses and is
submitted only as a sample of this practice and for the purpose of
illustrating the perception the trial judge had that it was
necessary to control the manner of plaintiff's presentation of the
evidence in order to insure a fair trial.
NAME OF WITNESS

EXAMINATION BY
MR. HARDING

PAGE NUMBERS ON
WHICH COURT
INTERRUPTED HARDING

Wendy Lee Steck

R. 719 to 746

R. 725, 726,
727, 728, 729,
730, 731, 732,
733, 734, 735,
736, 737, 738,
739, 741, 742,
743, 746

Tracy Twitchell

R. 751 to 763

R. 754, 755, 7558
759, 761, 762,
763

Sheri Lyn Andersen

R.
R.
R.
R.

776, 778, 781,
782, 783 786,
787, 789, 790,
791, 795, 796,
797 798 800,
801, 808, 805,
813 814 828,
833 840, 841,
843, 847, 848,
855 871 872,
875 880, 881,
883

Dr. Devon Nelson

R. 1004 to 1056
R. 1091 to 1097

773
838
893
983

to
to
to
to

835
875
914
990

R. 1010, 1011, 1012
1013, 1014, 1018,
1020, 1021, 1023,
1038, 1052, 1053,
1055, 1093, 1095

Appendix B
Page - 2 NAME OF WITNESS

EXAMINATION BY
MR. HARDING

PAGE NUMBERS ON
WHICH COURT
INTERRUPTED HARDING

Ronald Ivie

R. 1099 to 1113
R. 1127 to 1155
R. 1163 to 1165

R. 1103, 1104, 1105,
1106, 1107, 1108,
1133, 1135, 1137,
1138, 1139, 1140
1141, 1144, 1147,
1148, 1149, 1150,
1151, 1152, 1153,
1154, 1164

Jeffrey L. Matthews

R. 1168 to 1208
R. 1229 to 1231

R. 1187, 1208

Charles Hugo

R. 1233 to 1259
R. 1252 to 1269

R. 1235, 1236, 1246,
1247, 1249, 1254,
1255, 1257, 1258,
1265, 1266, 1267,
1268

Mark Fulton

R. 1271 to 1295
R. 1297 to 1298

Karen Fulton

R. 1298 to 1309

R. 1298, 1299, 1303,
1305, 1306, 1307,
1308, 1309

Lynn A. Anderson

R. 1324 to 1333
R. 1336

R. 1330, 1331

Lonnie Oman

R. 1338 to 1369

R. 1344, 1345, 1349,
1350, 1351, 1352,
1355, 1359, 1362,
1363, 1365, 1366,
1367, 1368

Lynn M. Gaufin

R. 1375 to 1420
R. 1437 to 1442

R. 1398, 1418, 1440

1287, 1289, 1293

Total pages of direct examination
by Mr. Harding during case
in chief:

466

Total pages on which there is at least
one unsolicited ruling or admonishment
by the court:

14 3

